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Towards Optimal Control of Evolutionary Games on Networks
James R. Riehl† and Ming Cao†
Abstract—We investigate the control of evolutionary
games on networks, in which each edge represents a two-
player repeating game between neighboring agents. After
each round of games, agents can update their strategies
based on local payoff and strategy information, while a
subset of agents can be assigned strategies and thus serve
as control inputs. We seek here the smallest set of control
agents needed to drive the network to a desired uniform
strategy state. After presenting exact solutions for com-
plete and star networks and describing a general solution
approach that is computationally practical only for small
networks, we design a fast algorithm for approximating the
solution on arbitrary networks using a weighted minimum
spanning tree and strategy propagation algorithm. We show
that the resulting approximation is exact for certain classes
of games on complete and star networks. Finally, simula-
tions demonstrate that the algorithm yields near-optimal
solutions in more general cases, although it performs best
for coordination games.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most remarkable trends of the modern
era is the rapid growth in connectivity of society and
technology. Accompanying this is an equally fast growth
in complexity of the systems we rely upon, resulting
in a whole new set of challenges that engineers must
overcome in the analysis of large dynamic networks
and the design of systems to interact with and regulate
them. This helps explain the recent boom in research
on networked systems and control theory in applica-
tions ranging from distributed sensing and robotics to
epidemic control and human decision making. Control
design for networked multi-agent systems traditionally
involves solving optimization problems, sometimes cen-
tralized and other times distributed, but very often with a
shared global objective. However, when the agents have
different or even competing objectives, as is often the
case, each agent must take into account the actions of its
competitors and single-objective optimization methods
fail. Game theory has long been used to tackle these
kinds of problems on a small scale and where the agents
are assumed to be perfectly rational [1], but for larger
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scale and more complex systems, these assumptions
often no longer hold and the strategy dynamics are better
modeled by evolutionary game theory [2].
A key innovation of evolutionary game theory is
that rather than assuming perfect rationality in a large
group of players, we allow strategies to propagate dy-
namically through the population based on the payoffs
acquired by the agents using these strategies [3]. In
biological terms, the mechanism for this propagation is
an evolutionary survival of the fittest process in which
reproductive potential is directly related to the payoffs
of the game. The agents need not be simple organisms
however; more complex systems such as human social
networks and robotic networks can also fit well into
an evolutionary game framework, but here the strategy
propagation mechanism can be better thought of as a
learning process or update rule. Indeed there have been
numerous studies on the best strategies and expected
outcomes of evolutionary games for various types of
population structures, payoff functions, and update rules
[2][4][5]. One of the well-established findings in the
field is that evolutionary games often lead to complex
and undesired outcomes with respect to the population
as a whole, such as in prisoner’s dilemma games or
tragedy of the commons, where selfishness tends to pre-
vail over cooperation, potentially resulting in congestion,
inefficiency, and depletion of resources [6][7]. There
is consequently a strong incentive to devise methods
for influencing evolutionary games in order to catalyze
better collective outcomes in populations.
In this work we seek solutions or approximations to a
minimal agent control problem on a broad class of net-
works and payoff matrices under imitative evolutionary
game dynamics. The complex structures of networked
games, which is a challenging obstacle in the analysis
of population dynamics, also offers a unique opportunity.
Depending on the topology of the network, there are very
likely to be certain agents that have more influence on
the network than others, and may thus be able to achieve
large shifts in strategy distribution at relatively low cost.
Hence one of the primary challenges we address in this
paper is to identify which agents are the most important
to control such that the network can most efficiently be
driven towards a desired strategy state.
II. EVOLUTIONARY GAME FRAMEWORK
The framework used in this paper consists of a net-
work, payoff matrix, and strategy update dynamics. We
define each of these concepts and related notation here.
Network and single-round payoffs: Let G = (V, E)
denote an undirected network whose node set V =
{1, . . . , n} corresponds to agents engaged in multiple 2-
player symmetric games defined by the edges E ⊆ V×V .
At each time step, the agents play a single strategy from
the finite set S := {A,B, . . . } against all neighbors and
receive payoffs upon completion of each game according
to the matrix M of size |S|×|S|. We denote the strategy
state by x(t)=[x1(t), . . . , xn(t)]
T
, where xi(t) ∈ S is the





where Ni := {j ∈ V : {i, j} ∈ E} is the neighbor set of
agent i and the most common values for the weights wi
are 1 for cumulative and 1|Ni| for averaged payoffs.
Strategy update dynamics: A fundamental concept of
evolutionary games is that better performing strategies
are adopted more often. This means rather than rationally
choosing best-response strategies, agents imitate strate-
gies in their neighborhood that result in higher payoffs.
We capture this dynamic with a strategy update rule that
is a function of neighboring strategies and payoffs:
xi(t+ 1) = f
({
xj(t), yj(t) : j ∈ Ni ∪ {i}
})
.
The only restrictions we make on the update rule is
that it is payoff monotone, i.e. players only switch to
strategies with which at least one agent in the neighbor-
hood achieves a greater payoff [2], and persistent, i.e.
if there exists a better performing strategy in an agent’s
neighborhood, then the agent will switch to that strategy
with a probability that is lower bounded by  > 0.
One example of such dynamics is the proportional
imitation rule, where each agent chooses a neighbor
randomly and if this neighbor received a higher payoff
in the previous round by using a different strategy, then
the agent will switch with a probability proportional to
the payoff difference. This widely studied model has
some nice properties, in particular that the strategy dis-
tributions in well-mixed populations using proportional
imitation can be approximated by the standard replicator















for each agent i ∈ V where j ∈ Ni is a randomly chosen
neighbor, λ > 0 is an arbitrary rate constant, and the
notation [z]10 indicates max(0,min(1, z)).
Strategy update with control agents: We add to this
conventional framework a set of control agents L ⊆ V
whose strategy can be externally manipulated, either
through direct control or by adding neighbors with artifi-




x∗i , i ∈ L
f(·), otherwise , (3)
where x∗i is the desired strategy for agent i and f(·) de-
notes the unforced strategy update rule. The combination
of a network, payoff matrix, and update rule forms what
we call a network game Γ := (G,M, f).
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Now that we have a general dynamic evolutionary
game model with control inputs, we are interested in
how one can influence the network through efficient use
of these inputs in order to achieve some desired outcome
of strategies. Before stating the problem, we define the
following notion of probabilistic convergence.
Definition 1. We say that xi(t) converges almost surely
to the strategy X if p[limt→∞ xi(t) = X] = 1, and
indicate this with the shorthand notation xi(t)→ X .
In this work, we focus on achieving consensus in
strategy A and pose what we call the Minimum Agent
Consensus Control (MACC) problem.
Problem 1 (MACC). Given a network game Γ and
initial strategy state x(0), find the smallest set of control
agents L such that xi(t)→ A for each agent i ∈ V .
IV. RELATED WORK
Although the literature on evolutionary games on net-
works in the absence of control is quite extensive [2][9],
we focus here on attempts to manipulate the outcome of
evolutionary games with some external control, which is
only beginning to see increased attention.
A natural starting point is the case of infinite and well-
mixed populations, where one can model the dynamics
of strategy proportion as a system of first order ODEs.
In the context of replicator dynamics, Kanazawa et al.
proposed using taxes and subsidies imposed by a govern-
ment or central administrator to alter the game payoffs
such that the players will converge to a desired strategy
[10]. They derive criteria for stabilization of prescribed
equilibria and simulate the approach on a congestion
control problem. Along similar lines, but using logit
choice dynamics, [11] introduced pricing schemes to
promote efficient choices on roadway networks, also
extended to more general economic contexts in [12].
Finite populations with complex structure are better
able to capture the complex interactions in real multi-
agent networks, but this increases the difficulty of anal-
ysis. In a continuous-time setting with best response
dynamics, [13] characterized the number of control
nodes required to stabilize desired equilibrium states
on path and star networks. Also, a recent simulation
study showed that controlling agents with higher degree
induced a higher frequency of cooperation than randomly
controlling agents in a prisoner’s dilemma game with
imitative dynamics on scale-free networks [14].
Finally, Cheng et al. presented a framework for the
control of networked evolutionary games using large-
scale logical dynamic networks to model transitions be-
tween all possible strategy states for various update rules
and derived equivalent conditions for reachability and
consensus of strategies on a network given a particular
set of control nodes [15]. However, the optimal control of
such systems remains a challenging open problem, and is
the primary focus of this paper, which builds upon earlier
work on deterministic [16] and two-strategy stochastic
[17] network games with new analytical results as well
an extension to the multiple-strategy stochastic setting
for arbitrary networks.
V. EXACT SOLUTIONS
One approach to solving the MACC problem exactly
involves building very large state transition probability
matrices similar to those used in [15], but for a sequence
of candidate control sets L. Since the goal is to find the
smallest control set for which the network converges to
the desired strategy state, one could start by checking
L := ∅ and proceed to all one-agent sets, two-agent sets,
etc. until the desired convergence occurs. In a network
game with n agents and s strategies, the total number of
possible strategy states is sn, and therefore the size of the
state transition matrix ΦL is sn×sn. Once the transition
probability matrix is constructed, the set of all stationary
states can be computed by finding the eigenvectors
corresponding to eigenvalues of ΦL equal to one. If the
desired strategy state is the only stationary state that is
accessible from x(0), then a solution has been reached.
Otherwise, the incremental search must proceed until this
condition is satisfied. Since ΦL becomes prohibitively
large even for medium sized networks, the computational
complexity of this approach is clearly too high to be
practical in general. Whether or not this problem belongs
to a well-known class of difficult problems such as NP-
hard remains an open research problem. If we restrict
to some highly structured classes of networks however,
exact analytical solutions are obtainable.
A. Two-strategy games on complete networks








A necessary condition for all agents initially playing B to
eventually switch to A is that the initial payoff of agents
playing A must be strictly greater than that of agents
playing B. Denoting these payoffs by yA and yB and
taking wi = 1, we can write this condition as follows:
yA = a(nA − 1) + bnB > cnA + d(nB − 1) = yB ,
where nA and nB denote the number of agents initially
playing A and B. Rearranging the terms yields
nA(a+ d− b− c) > n(d− b) + a− d, (4)
where we used the fact that nA + nB = n. We
immediately see that the characteristics of the game
change significantly depending on the sign of the term
δ = a+ d− b− c. If δ > 0, an agent switching from B
to A increases the payoff to agents already playing A,
and we say that the game is coordinating in strategy A.
On the other hand if δ < 0, an agent switching from B
to A decreases the payoff to agents playing A and we
say the game is anti-coordinating in A. Finally, if δ = 0
then the number of agents playing A has no net effect
on the payoff to agents playing A and we say the game
is neutrally-coordinating in A. Let γ = n(d−b)+a−d.
Using condition (4), we can solve for nA on complete
networks for each of these cases.
Proposition 1. The solution to the MACC problem on
complete networks with xi(0) = B for all agents is given
in the table below.








, γ ≥ 0
1, γ < 0
δ = 0 |L∗| =
{
n, γ ≥ 0
1, γ < 0
δ < 0 |L∗| =
{
n, γ ≥ −δ or mixed eq exists,
1, otherwise
Proof: For δ > 0, consider the energy-like function
V (x) := |{i ∈ V : xi = B}|. Let S∗ := {x ∈ Sn :
V (x) < γδ }. Due to (4) and the payoff monotonicity
assumption, V (x(t + 1)) ≤ V (x(t)) for all x(t) ∈ S∗,
which also implies that x(t + 1) ∈ S∗. Due to the
persistence assumption, p [V (x(t+ 1)) = V (x(t))] <
(1 − )V (x(t)). Let t0 = 0. It follows that
p
[∀t > t0, V (x(t)) = V (x(t0))] = 0, which implies
that p
[∃t1 > t0 : V (x(t1)) < V (x(t0))] = 1. By repeat-
ing this procedure, since V (x) is finite and takes discrete
values, there must exist a t∗ such that V (x(t∗)) = 0,
which implies that xi(t∗) = A for all i ∈ V . Hence
we have shown that x(0) ∈ S∗ =⇒ xi(t) → A. Due
to payoff monotonicity, if x(0) /∈ S∗ then x(t) /∈ S∗
for all t > 0 and there will be no convergence. There-
fore the minimum number of control agents needed to








For δ = 0, (4) is either never satisfied or always
satisfied depending on whether γ < 0 or γ ≥ 0 and thus
the size of S∗ equals ∅ or Sn, respectively. Therefore the
minimum number of control agents needed to ensure that
x(0) ∈ S∗ is n or 1.
Finally, for δ < 0, if γ ≥ −δ then there is clearly
no value nA > 0 which will satisfy (4) and n control
agents are needed. If γ < −δ, then nA = 1 satisfies (4).
However, if some but not all of the remaining agents
switch to A, then (4) is no longer satisfied and the
payoffs to the agents playing B will be greater. The state
will thus converge either to the desired equilibria of all
A, or a mixed equilibria, which exists if and only if
γ
δ < n and δ mod γ = 0.
B. Two-strategy games on star networks
Let us now consider networks with a star topology –
trees spanning one level with a root node connected to
n−1 branch nodes. In this case, for the B branch nodes
to switch to A, we must have the root node playing A
and a(nA − 1) + b(n − nA) > c. Let δ = a − b and
γ = b(1− n) + c. Then the inequality that must hold is








, yBr = cq + d(n− q − 1)
Proposition 2. The solution to the MACC problem on
star networks with xi(0) = B for all agents is given in
the Table I.
We refer the reader to [18] for the proof, which uses
very similar ideas to the proof of Proposition 1.
VI. APPROXIMATION FOR THE GENERAL CASE
Although it is much more difficult to solve the prob-
lem on networks of arbitrary structure, in this section we
TABLE I
δ > 0 |L∗| =

1, γ < 0
q, γ ≥ 0, yB < b
1 + q, γ ≥ 0, yB ≥ b
δ = 0 |L∗| =
{
1, γ ≥ 0
n, γ < 0
δ < 0 |L∗| =
{
1, n = 2 or γδ > n− 2,
n, otherwise
show how similar ideas to the solution for star networks
can be used to approximate the solutions on trees as
well as arbitrary networks. Originally designed for tree
networks in [19], we extended the approach to two-
strategy games on arbitrary networks in [17]. Here we
futher extend the approach to games with an arbitrary
number of strategies.
For convenience in describing the algorithm, we use
the analogy of a family tree starting from a single
common ancestor or root, and consisting of successive
generations or levels of parents and respective children.
Algorithm 1 achieves its objective by working from the
bottom of the tree towards the top (root), using the
following procedure to ensure that the desired strategy
can propagate in the reverse direction (down the tree)
at each level. For each parent agent, add children to the
control set in decreasing order of a switching threshold
(to be defined shortly) until all remaining children will
eventually switch to A once the agents in higher gener-
ations are playing A.
Before introducing the formal algorithm, we need to
define a few quantities and agent sets. First we choose
an arbitrary root agent r. Since any agent of a tree can
serve as the root, we will take r = 1 without loss of
generality. Denoting the number of levels by n`, let g :
V → {0, . . . , n`} be the mapping of agents to their level
in the tree rooted at r, which is equivalent to the number
of edges in the shortest path from the agent to the root.
Let V` := {i ∈ V : g(i) = `} denote the set of all agents
on level `, and let Cp := {c ∈ Vg(p)+1 : {p, c} ∈ E}
denote the set of children of a given agent p. Finally, we
define a function ρ : V → V ∪{0} mapping each agent
to its parent except for the root agent which is mapped
to zero.
Let T denote a minimum spanning tree of the original
network G using edge weights equal to the reciprocal of
the sum of the degrees of the adjacent nodes. Although
the modified algorithm will work with any spanning tree,
we choose these weights in order to retain the edges
adjacent to the highest-degree agents because these are
likely to be the most influential agents.
In several steps of Algorithm 1, we check the max-
imum or minimum achievable payoff for an agent in
a given strategy configuration. Let X ,Y ⊆ S denote
generic strategy subsets assigned to agent i and neighbor
j ∈ Ni ∪ {0}, respectively. We define the following
payoff bounds for agent i:
























where N−ji := Ni−{j} denotes the set of all neighbors
of agent i excluding j. In the case of singleton sets X =
{X} or Y = {Y }, we also use the shorthand notation
yˆX,Yi,j , and we denote the exclusion of a single strategy
by −X := {Y ∈ S : Y 6= X}. Next we define the
reachable strategy sets Ωi.
Since the spanning tree does not capture all possible
interactions in an arbitrary network, we need a method
for accounting for additional strategy transitions which
may occur. Let Ωi denote the set of strategies that
agent i might play in the course of the game. Let
L˜ ⊆ V denote a set of candidate control agents that
will be used in the process of Algorithm 1. The sets Ωi
are computed through an iterative strategy propagation
algorithm, defined in [17].
1 Lˆ := {r}
2 L˜ := V − {r}
3 ` := n`
4 while ` > 0 do
5 foreach p ∈ V`−1 do
6 L˜ := L˜ − Cp
7 Update the sets Ωi using Alg. ??






9 while yˇA,Ap,ρ(p) ≤ yˆ
−A,A
c∗,p do
10 Lˆ := Lˆ ∪ {c∗}








14 ` := `− 1
15 end
Algorithm 1: Computes an approximately min-
imal set of control agents Lˆ needed to drive an
arbitrary network to the desired strategy A.
Theorem 1. Given a network game Γ and initial strategy
state x(0), Algorithm 1 computes a sufficient set of
control agents Lˆ such that xi(t) → A for all agents
i ∈ V .
Proof: It suffices to show that for all i ∈ V , if there
exists τ ≥ 0 such that xi(τ) 6= A then there exists τ ′ > τ
such that xi(t) = A for all t ≥ τ ′. Working downwards
from the root r of the spanning tree T , consider an agent
i such that i ∈ Cr. Using the condition in step 9 with
Lemma 1 in [17] to bound the payoffs, we know that
either i ∈ Lˆ and xi(t) = A for all t ≥ 0, or yˇA,Ar,0 >
yˆ
−A,A
i,r , which implies that yr(0) > yi(0), and thus by
the persistence of the strategy update rule, xi(t) → A.
Similarly, for an agent i on arbitrary level `, we have
either i ∈ Lˆ or yˇA,Aρ(i),i > yˆ
−A,A
i,ρ(i), which implies that if
there exists a time τ ′′ such that xρ(i)(τ ′′) = A then
yρ(i)(τ
′′) > yi(τ ′′) and thus xi → A. We now have by
induction that xi → A for all agents i ∈ V .
Remark 1. For maximum efficiency, the payoff bounds
computed in the strategy propagation algorithm can be
reused both upon subsequent calls to Alg-SP and in the
remaining steps of Algorithm 1. If they are not, then the
worst case computational complexity is dominated by
the strategy propagation which can be performed up to
n times, yielding the conservative estimate of O(mn2),
where m is the number of edges.
VII. RESULTS: COMPLETE AND STAR NETWORKS
An important test of any approximation method is to
check the results on cases for which one can derive
the exact solutions analytically. Indeed the proposed
algorithms compute exact solutions for classes of two-
strategy games on star, complete, and ring networks [17].
Corollary 1. Algorithm 1 computes the exact solution
to the MACC problem on star networks for two-strategy
simple coordination games.
Corollary 2. Algorithm 1 computes the exact solution
to the MACC problem on complete networks for two-
strategy games that are coordinating in A.
VIII. SIMULATIONS
Although it is encouraging that Algorithm 1 produces
the expected results for certain classes of network games,
the purpose and strength of the general approach is
that it can be applied to arbitrary networks and payoff
matrices, and networks of much larger size than could
be computed exactly in a reasonable amount of time. In
this section, we use simulations to test the accuracy of
the approximation on small geometric random networks
using the exact solutions. We start with all agents playing
B and use the proportional imitation rule (2) with λ = 14 .
We consider three different types of games: stag hunt
(SH – a coordination game), prisoner’s dilemma (PD – a
game that is neutrally-coordinating in A), and snow drift
(SD - an anti-coordination game). We use the following
















Next, we test the algorithm on small geometric ran-
dom networks created by placing ten agents in the
unit square uniformly at random and connecting any
two agents that lie closer than a distance of 0.4 from
each other. We compare the approximate solutions of
Algorithm 1 to exact solutions computed by the method
described in Section V. We use small networks because
of the extreme computational complexity involved in
computing the exact solutions.
TABLE II
ACCURACY ON SMALL GEOMETRIC RANDOM NETWORKS
Game mean(|Lˆ|) mean(|Lˆ|−|L∗|) E[tˆ] E[t∗]
SH 4.27 1.01 1.63 5.52
PD 8.01 1.25 1.27 49.4
SD 8.31 4.34 1.32 289
Table II lists the mean difference between the size
of the approximate minimum control set Lˆ and the true
minimum L∗. Much of the difference in the SD results is
attributable to the anti-coordinating effect resulting in a
tradeoff between size of the control set and the expected
convergence times E[tˆ] and E[t∗] listed in columns 3
and 4.
IX. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we posed a minimum-agent control prob-
lem for a class of evolutionary games on networks. After
first presenting exact solutions to the problem for two-
strategy games on complete and star networks as well as
a general solution approach that is computationally com-
plex, we introduced a fast algorithm for approximating
the solution on arbitrary networks and payoff matrices.
The proposed algorithm computes the exact solutions for
a class of games on complete and star networks, and we
demonstrated via simulations that the algorithm is quite
accurate on more small geometric random networks,
particularly for games that are coordinating in the desired
strategy. Interesting research directions for the future
include relaxing the assumption of payoff monotonicity
towards development of a more robust result, allowing
for dynamic control sequences, and investigating targeted
payoff control as an alternative to direct strategy control.
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